On Thu, 2009-12-31 at 11:06 +0100, Grzegorz Nosek wrote:
Hi all,
I have a problem trying to run sshd via xinetd on a CentOS 5.4 system (I want to slap a tcpwrappers-style wrapper before sshd, so I need it that way).
In permissive mode I can log in/out with the following failures reported by audit2allow:
allow amanda_t consoletype_exec_t:file { execute execute_no_trans }; allow amanda_t devpts_t:chr_file { write ioctl }; allow amanda_t hostname_exec_t:file { execute execute_no_trans }; allow amanda_t shell_exec_t:file entrypoint;
I don't even have amanda installed, so the context is clearly bogus.
After a chat on #fedora-selinux it seems that sshd cannot find its default context, so falls back to the first available one, which happens to be something:something:amanda_t (the list is read from /selinux/user). This operation is performed by sshd itself (as verified by strace).
I don't need Fort Knox type security but I'd like to use SELinux to tighten down other parts of the system, so I'd really like to use the enforcing mode.
Any hints? A good TFM to R will hopefully do.
In what label/context are xinetd and sshd running (ps -eZ)? What are the file security contexts on their executables (ls -Z)?