On Mar 11, 2011, at 11:48 AM, Dominick Grift wrote:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1
On 03/11/2011 05:42 PM, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
On 03/11/2011 10:57 AM, Maria Iano wrote:
I'm getting a denial that audit2why says is due to constraints. Sesearch does show that the action has an allow rule.
Here are the audit messages:
host=eng-vocngcn03.eng.gci type=AVC msg=audit(1299844473.770:740848): avc: denied { sigkill } for pid=22927 comm="kill" scontext=system_u:system_r:rgmanager_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=process
host=eng-vocngcn03.eng.gci type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1299844473.770:740848): arch=c000003e syscall=62 success=yes exit=0 a0=19ba a1=9 a2=9 a3=0 items=0 ppid=20173 pid=22927 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 comm="kill" exe="/bin/kill" subj=system_u:system_r:rgmanager_t:s0 key=(null)
You have rgmanager sending a kill signal to a process running as unconfined_t
There is no proof that its rgmanager doing that imho. Since rgmanager_t is an unconfined_domain it could be any generic application started by a process running in the rgmanager_t domain (eventually started by rgmanager)
We have red hat clustering running on the server, and the clustering processes are running as rgmanager_t. When we move a service off the server to another node, the clustering software calls a vendor script like the red hat init.d scripts, with the stop command. That vendor script calls another script which is a stop script. That stop scripts if full of kill commands - that match all running processes against various expressions and kill them.
We do have a custom policy with a bunch of allow rules but none of them allow a domain transition.
Thanks, Maria